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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
§57-1-32, Utah Code Ann., as amended, 1953.
57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee — Action
to recover balance due upon obligation for which trust
deed was given as security — Collection of costs and
attorney's fees.
At any time within three months after any sale of
property under a trust deed, as hereinabove provided,
an action may be commenced to recover the balance due
upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given
as security, and in such action the complaint shall set
forth the entire amount of the indebtedness which was
secured by such trust deed, the amount for which such
property was sold, and the fair market value thereof at
the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the court
shall find the fair market value at the date of sale of
the property sold. The court may not render judgment
for more than the amount by which the amount of the
indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of
sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds
the fair market value of the property as of the date of
the sale. In any action brought under this section,
the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its
costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing
an action under this section.
§78-37-1, Utah Code Ann., as amended, 1953.
78-37-1. Form of action —
execution.

Judgment —

Special

There can be one action for the recovery of any
debt or the enforcement of any right secured solely by
mortgage upon real estate which action must be in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
Judgments shall be given adjudging the amount due, with
costs and disbursements, and the sale of mortgaged
property, or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount
and accruing costs, and directing the sheriff to
proceed and sell the same according to the provisions
of law relating to sales on execution, and a special
execution or order of sale shall be issued for that
purpose.
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(Trial Court Record (hereinafter "R") p. 45) (Exhibit C #4).

He

apparently kept this check, unnegotiated, for approximately one
year.
USCU exercised the power of sale provided for in the
Trust Deed and conducted a Trustee's Sale on April 29, 1986. The
property described in Exhibit A was at that time purchased by
USCU for $90,000.00.

The balance due on the note at the time of

the sale was $112,566.30 leaving a balance still due after
application of the sale proceeds. (Exhibit B #3).
USCU first became aware of the issuance of the $27,850.00
check from Guardian Title in November of 1986, when it received a
letter from Guardian Title Company requesting the help of the
Credfit Union to determine why the check had not been negotiated.
(R. p. 45) (Exhibit C #5).
USCU met with Vail Phillips later in November of 1986, at
which time the issuance of the check was discussed by the
parties.

At that time, they discussed the possibility of

depositing the money into an escrow account with USCU, but
Plaintiff refused to so deposit the money. (R. p. 21).
This check was then cancelled by Guardian Title and a new
check was reissued by Guardian Title Company on December 11,
1986, for the same amount.

This second check was also concealed

from USCU and was neither negotiated nor deposited by the
Plaintiff.

(R. pp. 8-10) (Exhibit C #7, #8).

The amount requested by said check was ultimately
collected by the Plaintiff on May 12, 1987, by way of execution
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Furthermore, these funds were in excess of the balance still due
after the foreclosure of the Trust Deed.
USCU was precluded from filing for a deficiency for the
following reasons.

First, there was no deficiency.

The money

from the assigned mortgage was more than sufficient to pay off
the remaining debt owed by Phillips to USCU.
In this case, the security could not be liquidated
because the mortgage which had been assigned to USCU was not in
default.

USCU could take no action on that mortgage unless it

became delinquent.

The funds were tendered properly by the title

company, but improperly held and concealed by Phillips.
Second, the One Action Rule as set forth by §78-37-1
precluded USCU from filing for a deficiency.

In order to file

for a deficiency, USCU was required to first liquidate all its
collateral.

As set forth above, the additional collateral could

not be liquidated.
§57-1-32, does not preclude USCU from receiving the
additional amounts owed from the further pledged security.

This

statute, as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court, only prevents
additional judicial remedies.

Receipt of the additional monies

coming to USCU under the note was not judicial remedy covered by
the statute.

Furthermore, had USCU sought judicial relief for

deficiency against Phillips at this point it would have waived
its right to the additional collateral.
Thus it wasimpossible for USCU to comply with both §571-32 and §78-37-1. Rules of Statutory Interpretation therefore
7

preclude the interpretation of §57-1-32 expressed by the Trial
Court as it would defeat the intent of the statues and make their
application an absurdity.
Additionally, Phillips should be equitably estopped from
working a fraud on USCU.

Such will be the result if USCU is

precluded from receiving the balance owed on its note from the
security, namely the unnegotiated check which had been in the
possession of Phillips for over a year.

Clearly an individual

should not be allowed to abuse the law by using it to perpetrate
a fraud on his creditors.
Finally, §57-1-32 does not bar a tort claim for
conversion.

The necessary elements for conversion having been

found by the Trial Court, USCU is entitled, as a matter of law,
to its claim for damages against Phillips.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. §57-1-32 IS
INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE.
A.

Utah Law Required USCU to Satisfy
The Balance Due On The Debt By First
Exhausting All Security Pledged.

Utah State Credit Union was obligated under Utah Law to
satisfy the balance due on the debt owed from Phillips by first
exhausting all security before it could proceed against Phillips
personally.

This rule was set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in

Bank of Ephraim v Davis, 581 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1978).

Security

must be exhausted as to both quantity and quality.

Salt Lake

8

Valley Loan & Trust Co. v Millspauah. 54 P. 893 (Utah 1889);
Bawden & Associates v Smith, 646 P.2d 711 (Utah 1982).
Furthermore, no personal liability exists until all security
pledged is exhausted.

Hammond v Wall, 171 P. 148 (Utah 1917);

Utah Mortgage & Loan Co. v Black, 618 P.2d 43 (Utah 1980).

Once

all security has been exhausted then a mortgagee can proceed
against the mortgager personally, and then only through
judicially available remedies, that is by means of a deficiency
judgment for any deficiency.

Cox v Green, 696 P.2d 1207 (Utah

1985).
The courts can impose personal liability on
the mortgagor only after having ordered sale of
the property; and, if after sale, a deficiency
appears . . . The status of a mortgage debt under
78-37-1 is somewhat analogous to one not yet due
or one which lacks mutuality. Although the debt
is past due, the creditor is not yet in a position
to obtain personal judgment against the debtor, or
to proceed to satisfy the debt out of the debtor's
assets other than the mortgaged property. Davis
at 1003.
USCU was in the process of satisfying the balance due on
Plaintiff's note by liquidating its collateral.

Defendant could

not maintain a deficiency action against Phillips while remaining
security had still not been liquidated.

Therefore, §57-1-32

cannot have a meaningful application to this case.
B.

§57-1-32 Is Inapplicable Because
There Was No Deficiency

The amount credited by USCU from the Trustee's Sale was
$90,000.00.

This left a balance due of $22,566.30.

The amount

of the check from the title company which was intentionally
9

concealed from USCU by Phillips was for $27,850.00. These funds
had been legally assigned to the Credit Union.

The amount was

more than enough to pay the balance still due by USCU.

There

being sufficient collateral remaining, in the form of the note
and mortgage to meet the balance due on the loan from USCU to
Phillips, there was no deficiency to sue upon.

It was only upon

the release of the assignment by the Trial Court that a
deficiency occurred.
In Utah Mortgage & Loan Co. v Black, 618 P.2d 43, 45
(Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court found that §78-37-1, known as
the "One-Action Rule" limits a creditor to one remedy in
exhausting his security before having recourse to the debtor for
a deficiency.

The Court found:

Consequently, if the creditor (Plaintiff) here
fails to comply with the statute in not applying the
security to the Defendant's obligation in accordance
with their agreement, that would preclude its recovery
of any deficiency against them. Utah Mortgage & Loan
Co. at 45.
Since no deficiency arises until all security is
exhausted, and since the security could not all be exhausted at
that time as there had been no default upon the assigned mortgage
and note, no action could be taken to recover any deficiency
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32.
In a case somewhat analogous to the present, the Utah
Supreme Court in Bawden & Associates v Smith, 646 P.2d 711 (Utah
1982) found:
Where two mortgages were foreclosed in one
suit but only one was sold, a deficiency judgment
could be entered against the mortgager only if
10

the unsatisfied mortgage with respect to the
parcel sold, plus costs and attorney's fees were
more than the sale price, and deficiency could not
be entered with respect to the second parcel until
it also was sold and proceeds applied against the
indebtedness and costs secured thereby." Bawden &
Associates at 714.
Applying the Courtfs reasoning to the current case, where
only one of the two items of security was foreclosed and sold,
USCU could not obtain a deficiency judgment against Phillips
unless the unforeclosed security, the mortgage and note, was
worth less than the remaining unpaid balance of the loan.
Clearly, in this case, that was not so.

The check concealed by

Phillips was more than sufficient to pay the remaining balance of
the loan.

Therefore, there was no deficiency and §57-1-32 is

inapplicable.

See also First Security Bank v Felger, 658 F. Supp

175 (D. Utah 1987).
In its Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment the Trial
Court apparently relied upon Cox v. Green, Supra, and Concepts.
Inc. v First Security Reality Services, 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah
1987).

These two cases, however, a clearly distinguished from

the instant case.

In those two cases the only security was a

Trust Deed upon a single parcel of property.
foreclosure, all security was exhausted.

Therefore upon

The instant case can be

further distinguished from Cox and Concepts, Inc. in that, in
both Cox and Concepts, Inc. the creditor was attempting to
recover damages against the debtor personally.

In the instant

case, USCU was only seeking to retain its valid interest in the
additional security.

Therefore, the Court's holding in Cox and
11

Concepts, Inc. is inapplicable to the instant case.
C.

Plaintiff Should Be Estopped From
Perverting The Intent of §57-1-32.

§57-1-32 and §78-37-1 were both created to prevent double
recovery by creditors
reaching.

and to prevent creditors from any over-

See First Security Bank v Felcrer, 658 F. Supp. 175 (D.

Utah 1987).

The statutes were not created to allow a debtor to

defraud his creditors.

In the current case, the debtor,

Phillips, had in his possession monies to which USCU was legally
entitled.

He willfully concealed those funds from USCU. (R. p.

12-14).
Those funds were sufficient to clear any default on the
loan prior to the Trust Deed foreclosure and were more than
sufficient to meet the balance owed after the foreclosure sale.
(R. p. 13) .
A finding therefore, that Phillips is entitled to a
reassignment of the note and mortgage and its proceeds, is an
endorsement of Phillips1 devious efforts to avoid payment of his
just debt to USCU.
POINT II. USCU'S COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST PHILLIPS
SHOULD BE GRANTED AS A MATTER OF LAW
A.

Plaintiff's Conduct Constitutes
Conversion Of USCU's Property

Utah follows orthodox criteria in applying the doctrine
of conversion.

Benton v. Division of State Lands & Forestry. 709
12

P.2d 362,365 (Utah 1985).
A conversion is an act of willful interference
with a chattel, done without lawful justification,
by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of
its use and possession . . .
Although conversion results only from intentional
conduct, but it does not require a conscious wrong
doing, and an intent to exercise dominion or control
over goods inconsistent with [their] owner's right of
suffices. Allred v Hinkley. 328 P.2d 726 at 728 (Utah
1958).
The Record of the Trial Court shows that Phillips knew
the check he received from the title company was
part of the security pledged to USCU. (R. p. 11)

The Record

further shows that Phillips knew his note to USCU was in default.
(R. p. 12) .
After default a debtor has lost his right of possession
in property subject to a security interest and retains only a
contingent right in the surplus, if any, after the sale. Murdock
v Blake. 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164 (1971).
Phillips1 counsel admitted that the assignment was a
valid one.

(R. p. 38). Furthermore, the Trial Court found that

the Credit Union was entitled to the payment.

(R. p. 36). In

spite of USCU's meeting all the criteria necessary for a claim of
conversion, the Trial Court held no claim existed because of the
bar against collections of deficiencies more than ninety (90)
days following foreclosure. (R. p. 41). Such a reading of the
statute is clearly overbroad.
The tort action for conversion is completely separate
from any action that could have been brought for a deficiency,
13

had one existed.

This is simply a matter of one party, Phillips,

exercising unlawful control over the property of another, USCU.
Surely the statute could not be read so as to preclude
the eviction of a person whom has been foreclosed on, if the
eviction action is taken over 90 days after a foreclosure.

Yet,

using the Trial Court's reasoning this would be the application
of the statute.

Independent causes of action cannot be barred by

§57-1-32 where they do not comprise an attempt to obtain a
deficiency against a debtor.

Therefore, USCU's claim for

conversion, having been established as a matter of law, should be
granted.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court erred
in awarding Judgment against USCU for the following reasons:
(1)

USCU was prevented from bringing a deficiency action

against Phillips pursuant to the One-Action Rule until all its
collateral had been exhausted.
(2)

There was no deficiency, and therefore no cause of

action under §57-1-32, until the Trial Court's release of the
assignment of mortgage and note to Phillips.
(3)

The Trial Court's interpretation of §57-1-32 is

erroneous as it conflicts with §78-37-1.
(4)

Phillips should be equitably estopped from pleading

§57-1-32 as a defense, because to allow him to do so is to put a
judicial stamp of approval on Phillips' devious attempts to avoid
payment of his just debt to USCU.

14

(5)

U.C.A. §57-1-32 is inapplicable as a defense to

USCU's Counterclaim.
(6)

Phillips' conduct constitutes conversion of property

of USCU.
Appellant, therefore, respectfully requests that the
Judgment of the District Court be reversed with respect to its
Motion for Summary Judgment and denial of USCU's Counterclaim
against Plaintiff, and that this Court award Judgment to
Defendant as a matter of law in the amount of $22,560.30,
together with interest, costs and such other relief as is
appropriate.
Respectfully Submitted this

day of January, 1990.

DALE R. KENT
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the
day
ofJanuary, 1990, four true and correct copies of the foregoing
document were mailed to Byron L. Stubbs, 53 0 East 500 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, 84102.

15

EXHIBIT A

A-1

Exhibit 1-P and this is the check which Y O U previously
identified.
A

Tell me when that check was issued?

Well, I think that check was originally issued

in 1985.
Q

No, that particular check.

A

This particular check?

Q

Sir, what is the date on the check?

A

It shows December 11, 1986.

Q

So then, this isn't the check that you

testified you talked to Terry Rawiings about?
A

Well, I had a check prior to this time that I

talked with Terry about.
0

Let me show you what your counsel has marked as

Exhibit 2-P.

Is this the check then that you say you had

in your possession at the -cime you talked to the credit
union?
A

I would think so.

0

What is the date of tnat check?

A

That cne is November I?, 1985.

Q

Now, do you recall why there are two checks for

the same amount?
A

I am nor sure.
MR. STUBBS:

For the record, I have no

objection tc 2-P, assuming it is offered.
MR. KENT:

No objection.

THE COURT:
Q

2-P is received.

(By Mr. Kent) Isn't it ~rue that Exhibit 1 was

simply a re-issue of Exhibit 2"?
A

One check was a re-issue of the former check.

Q

So represented the same thing?

A

Same thing.

Q

So, Exhibit 2, the earlier check, was never

negotiated, cashed or anything else done with it?
A

No.

Q

Did you just tear it up?

A

It was returned to the title company.

Q

Now, I think you told me you are certain that

What happened to it?

this conversation with the credit union took place after
the foreclosure; is that right?
A

Yes.

Q

And you talked to Terry Rawlings?

A

Right.

Q

Now, is it not true, that the reason you were

there to talk to Terry Rawlings was because he called you
to ask you where is the check?
A

No, that isn't true.

I had a number of

conversations with Verl Wright and Veri Wright set up an
appointment for me to go up and talk to Terry Rawlings.
It was my instigation and not Terry's.
MR. KENT:

I see.

That is all the questions I

have.
THE COURT:

Mr. Stubbs.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. STUBBS:
Q

Mr. Phillips, you have indicated, I want to pin

down again exactly when you had the conversation, as near
as possible.

The Notice of Default which Mr. Kent sent

out was sent in November of 1985?
A

Yes.

Q

Do you have a recollection of receiving that?

A

Yes.

Q

Now then, the foreclosure sale was held in

April of 1986?
A

Right.

Q

When did your conversation, did it take place

after the Notice of Default and before this sale, or
Mr. Kent's question was:

After -che foreclosure, which

would not have been completed until after April?
A

Well, I would think it was after *che

foreclosure.
Q

And you had no conversations with the credit

union from the time you received the Notice of Default
until after the sale in April?
A

Yes, I had several with the fellow downstairs

mostly about my ability to take care of the payments, but
10

I was not in a position that I could continue payments.
Q

Prior to the foreclosure sale, did you have any

conversation with anyone at the credit union with regard
to the check that you had in your possession?
A

I can't remember.
HR. STUBBS:

I have no further questions.

RECROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. KENT:
Q

What was the purpose of this check we are

talking about?
A

Why did you have this check?

Well, that was a payment or. the mortgage that

we had assigned to the credit union.
Q

And there had been payments prior to this

one,

had there not, made to you pursuant to that assignment of
mortgage?
A

You say there had been payments on this

mortgage prior?
0.

Yes.

A

Yes. there had.

Q

And, in fact, in past years isn't it true that

from the time you executed the note with the credit
union, you would have received a waiver from the credit
union in order to negotiate the checks or so the check
would be made directly payable to you without the credit
union's name on it also?
11

A

Yes, we had done that.

Q

You had done that in the past.

received this check, Exhibit 2, m

Mow, you

November of 1985;

isn't rhat correct?
A

Yes.

Q

A^d it is $27,000?

A

Yes.

Q

And that represented a payment on a mortgage

which had been assigned to the credit union, did it nor?
A

That was representative.

on a mortgage.
Q

Yes, it was a payment

It had been assigned to the credit union.

And your loan with the credit union about this

time was in default, was it not, was delinquent?
A

I think it was m

default from something like

September to November when they —

when the Notice of

Default was served.
Q

And von never brought that check into the

credit union, though, .lid you, to cure the default?
A

No.

Q

Even "enough that check had been made payable

jointly to yourself and the credit union; is that not
true?
A

That is true.

Q

Even tnough you were aware that that money

coming in on that mortgage had been assigned to the
12

credit union for security for payment cf your note; is
that not true?
A

That had my note been current, that would have

been reassigned to me anyway.
0

So, the question was, you knew when you kept

the money tShat rightfully that money belonged to the
credit union because you had assigned that money to the
credit union?
A

No, I don't believe it belonged to the credit

union.
Q
effect

You have testified you were aware and knew the
of the assignment of the mortgage: isn't that

right?
A

After the mortgage

Q

Excuse me.

—

The question was, is it not right

that you are aware at the time you received that check
that-that money had been assigned by you to the credit
union to pay your note?
A

Is that net true?

It was assigned for additional collateral for

that note, yes.
Q

Now, so you could have cured the delinquency at

any time, at any time, if you had simply tendered that
check to the credit union, couldn't you?
A

I could have brought it current, I guess, with

that check.
13

Q

And you refused tc :o that, didn't you?

A

I didn't do it.

Q

And is it not zrue

tnat you didn't even re11

the credit union that you had the check?
A

I don't remember wnen the credit union became

aware that I had the check.
Q

Well, let me refresh your recollection.

Is it

not true that the credit union didn't become aware that
you had the check until November of 1986; is that not
t rue ?
A

No, I am sure it was before November of 1986.

Q

Was it then, by your recollection, during this

conversation you had with the credit union about
depositing that check which was some time after April of
'86?
A

I would say it was some time between April and

it was prior t? the time that w^ filed suit.
0

It is your testimony also, is it not, that vou

did net tell tne credit union you had this cneck until
after the foreclosure had been completed?

That is true,

isn't it?
A

That :s true.
MR. -".EMTi

That is all the Questions I have.

Your Hcncr.

14

to clarify the matter.

Then I called Mr. Phillips on the

phone and asked him about the check.
Q

Was anyone else present during that

conversation that you recall?
A

No, I don't believe so.

Q

Will you relate to me what that conversation

A

I just asked him why he had not approached us

was?

with the check to have it endorsed so we could have
applied towards the proceeds of his loan.
Q

And what was his response?

A

He wanted to come in and try and talk about it.

So subsequently we set up an appointment and he came in
and to talk about the check, and I asked him if he would
like to put it on deposit in the credit union until the
matter could be resolved and apparently he wasn't
agreeable to that because txhe check was never deposited
at the credit union.
Q

You say, though, you did offer to allow this

check to be deposited and held in escrow pending the
resolution of who was entitled tc the money?
A

Yes.

Q

And he refused to do that?

A

He was not agreeable to putting it en deposit

at the credit union, correct.
21

MR. STUBBS:
THE COURT:

Forged it?
He forged it and put it in his own

account someplace else.

Do you think you could stand

here today and say they can't go after us on a
deficiency, so they are out the money on that?
MR. STUEBS:
THE COURT:

But that didn't happen.
But we all agree if it had

happened, it doesn't matter that the credit union can't
go after him on the deficiency.

They would still be

entitled to that check that had been wrongly forged.

We

all agree on that.
MR. STUEBS:

On a different theory, on a

different theory entirely.
THE COURT:

Now, we come down to where there

was a legal assignment, an assignment of the payments I
suppose that the credit union was entitled to.
MR. STUEBS:
THE COURT:

And I think

—

And he has withheld that from them

and now your argument is the same:

"But it is too late

because, after ail, they can't come after us on a
deficiency.
MR. STUBBS:

They knew they had the assignment

and they knew the check was to be made.

They could have

sued and foreclosed, which they did, and sued on a
deficiency and executed on the check just like we did

around for a year?
MR. KENT:

1 don't think we are.

Mo. 1, that

is not the case where he has money that he owes us and he
doesn't have the money.

That is not this case.

case, he has got money that belongs to —
hands of a third party.

that is in the

All he has is evidence ct it.

The third party has got the money.
was pledged.

This

He knows that money

He knows that payment is due to the credit

union and he intentionally hides that from them.

It is

not his money, but it is someone else's money that is due
to the credit union.
THE COURT:
legal assignment?

Let me ask you this.

Was this a

Was this an actual assignment of his

rights to that real estate contract to the credit union?
MR. STUBBS:
MR. KENT:

Yes, it was assigned, Your Honor.

Yes.

THE COURT:
MR. STUEBS:

Then, why isn't that money there?
It was assigned to them and it

would have been theirs and they would have been entitled
to it had they not accepted the property that they took
as primary security as full payment of the debt.

They

accepted the property.
THE COURT:

Now, we come back to that argument.

Once you take "he property on the foreclosure, then you
forego that right?
38

clarified from the testimony I have heara toaay and I am
going to let my prior ruling stana, cut I can understand
the argument ana it isn't -- it certainly isn't an open
and shut case.

Iz certainly isn t a case of bad faith

and it certainly isn't a case that they don't have an
argument and the cnances are good you will both go
througn the cost of an appeal.
and ycu are back here again.

I could well be reversed
But I can understand your

argument, and it is a technical, legal cne and I
understand ycur argument.

It is more an equitable

but I think ycu nave got a legal argument too.

one.

And the

question comes down -- There is no question in my mind,
if he had forgea the instrument, there is no question
that tnat had nothing to do with the deficiency.

He had

to give them bacK the money.
Now, we step baci: cne step ana say:

In this

?ase^ T.ere was an assignment and ne carried tnat zheck

deficiency cr net?

That is really the issue.

what we really come aown to.

That is

And Mr. Stubbs is arguing,

'It reaily isn't because when they foreclosed they took
it in lieu of. and if there is a deficiency, they ran
file an answer.
it.

Your argument was.

Mo, we didn't take

We were ^ntit^ea tc it to begin with and it has

nothing to ao with tne deficiency,"

That is it for an
41

appeal, and I can see that coming.

Okay, go ahead with

your argument on interest and att:rney fees.
MR. KENT:

I am through with the interest.

Just the attorney fees that the parties indicated under
Katie vs. Johnson.

You get attorney fees under that.

The faith statute, you have got to show bad
faith, or that the defense is not asserting in good
faith, and it is done with the intent to defraud, hinder,
those kind of things.
in this case.

And it is clear that was net done

The statute is inapplicable.

Just because

we are ruled against, does not mean the defense was not
meritorious or without merit.

Certainly, as the Court

has indicated, we have strong legal principles that we
are standing on.

The attorney fees aren't proper under

that statute.
The other statute that talks about if attorney
fees "are provided for in a contract, the one side or the
other side gets them.

That is inapplicable because that

statute on its face says for contracts or notes entered
into after April 23, 1986, then that rule applies.
were entered into years before that.

These

So, that doesn't

apply either.
The third ground upon which Mr. Stubbs asserts
they might be act lied and entitle?, to some attorney fees
has to do with this case, that he cited and talks about
42

know about this check is six or eight months down the
road, and a year later the check is issued.

And on that

basis I will submit they are not entitled to any further
relief.
THE COURT:
MR. STUBBS:

Mr. Stubbs, anything further?
Yes, the one point on the interest

that he talked about in the beginning of his argument,
Your Honor.

I don't think it is that difficult to

determine a date when the interest starts in this case.
They have the foreclosure sale.

They have got 90 days

from the date of that foreclosure sale to file for a
deficiency.

They don't file for a deficiency, therefore

the interest starts on the date of the foreclosure sale,
not 90 days after that.
It is not that difficult.

That is when they started it.
We didn't speculate on the 18

percent or the 20 percent of what he was paying.
wouldn't let him do that if he wanted to.

I

I'd say, "You

have got to stick to tne legal rate of interest, which is
10 percent."

We have no ambiguity as to the time or

ambiguity as r o the amount because we stuck with the
legal figure.
Other than that, Your Honor, I submit it.
think the Court pretty well understands.
THE COURT:

The Court makes the following

findings in regards to the evidence given, that the

I

credit union was unaware of this check, the check of
November, 1985.

They became unaware of it until November

of 1986, and that the inquiry was made by a
representative of the credit union of Mr. Phillips, when
the credit union was contacted by the title company
concerning the check that was still outstanding.
The Court is going to find that there was a
failure on Mr. Phillips tc mitigate in this matter, and
the Court has already expressed its grave concern I think
concerning that check and the entitlements in regards tc
that.

But understands the arguments made of counsel and,

on balance all things considered, is going to allow its
prior ruling to stand in regards to that.
As to prejudgment interest, the Court is going
to deny the same on the grounds that it is not really
fixed and unliquidated and cannot be really determined,
and the Court is also going to deny the attorney fees.
It certainly is not a frivolous :r bad faith effort on
the part of the defendants in this matter, and the Court
will deny the motion for attorney fees.

Deny the

attorney fees, as well as the interest f:r the reasons
stated in the defendant's memorandum in this regard.
Nov; I suppose that ties it all back up so that
it can new be appealed and they will accept it on appeal,
and we will see what they do with this matter.
45

EXHIBIT B

B-1

BYRON L. STUBBS (3145)
Attorney for Plaintiff
530 East Fifth South
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84102
(801) 328-4207
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
VAIL J. PHILLIPS,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
UTAH STATE CREDIT UNION,
a Utah corporation,

Civil No. C-87-311
Judge Leonard H. Russon

Defendant.
The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and in
response thereto the defendant also filed such a motion; oral
argument on both motions was heard by the court on the 13th day of
April, 1987; counsel for the parties filed written memorandums of
points & authorities and the court having reviewed said memorandums
as well as the pleadings of the respective parties on file in this
case, and being fully advised in the premises, now enters the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff, on or about the 18th day of November 1980,

borrowed from defendant $150,000.00 and gave said defendant as
security for said loan a Trust Deed.

As part of said original

transaction the plaintiff, as additional security, assigned to
defendant a real estate mortgage and note owned by plaintiff.
2.

Plaintiff failed to make payment to defendant on the

§150,000 note secured by the trust deed, and on the 29th day of
October 1985, defendant served plaintiff with a written declaration
of default which was recorded November 21, 1985.
3.

Subsequent thereto and pursuant to said notice of

default, a trustee sale was held on April 29, 1986, and the property
covered by said trust deed securing the $150,000.00 note was
purchased by the defendant at the trustee's sale for the sum of
$90,000.00.
4.

Plaintiff filed this action demanding reassignment of the

mortgage and note given as additional security together with any and
all proceeds now due or to become due thereon based upon the fact
that more than three months had passed since the date of the sale of
the real property and the defendant failed to commence an action for
any deficiency pursuant to §57-1-32, Utah Code Annotated.
5.

Defendant claimed that it was not estopped from

continuing to collect monies due on the debt until the balance was
paid in full after the trustee's sale.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The court concludes that §57-1-32, supra, as interpreted

by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Cox v Green 696 P2d

-2-

1207 (Utah 1985), provides the exclusive procedure for securing a
deficiency judgment following a sale of real property under a trust
deed, and plaintiffs1 election to sell the property to satisfy the
debt and failure to comply with said section precludes them from
seeking any other remedy.
2.

The defendant in this matter elected its remedy of

non-judicial trust sale and in doing so was required to comply wich
§57-1-32, Utah Code Annotated, which requires that the action be
filed within three months of the date of sale.

Defendant, having

failed to comply, is now precluded from seeking any other remedy
including a deficiency against the plaintiff.
3.

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should by reason

of the foregoing be granted, and the mortgage and note in question
should be re-assigned to him together with any and all proceeds now
due or to become due thereon.
4.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied.

DATED this

^ 7*

day of April, 1987
BY THE COURT:

JUDGE
Approved as to form:

DALE R. KENT
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered a copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law this -£--2^ day of April,
1987, to:
Dale R. Kent
Attorney for Defendant
660 South 200 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake Citv, Ut 84111

EXHIBIT C

C-1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VAIL J. PHILLIPS,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO. C-87-311

vs.
UTAH STATE CREDIT UNION,
A Utah corporation,
Defendant.

Motions for Summary Judgment filed by both parties came
on for hearing on April 13, 1987.

Following argument of counsel,

the Court took the matter under advisement.

The Court has now

reviewed the file, the Memoranda of Points and Authorities filed
by both parties, and the authorities cited, and herein renders
its decision.
The plaintiff made a loan from the defendant in the amount
of $150,000.00.

Plaintiff gave defendant a trust deed note,

and trust deed in regards to the said lean.

As "additional

security'1 plaintiff assigned a real estate mortgage and note
to the defendant.
Plaintiff failed to make payments on the note, and on October
29, 1985 defendant served plaintiff with a written declaration
of default.

This document was recorded November 21, 1985.

After notice, a trust deed sale was held on April 29, 1986,
where the property was purchased for $90,000.00.
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Since defendant has no right as to a deficiency against
the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to have restored to
him the mortgage and proceeds in regards thereto.
Plaintiff! s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Defendant * s
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
Plaintiff will prepare the Order and Summary Judgment.
Dated this

/^

day of April, 1987.

I %\

L €C- n a r:C

H , CLLZZQ n

LEONARD H. RUSSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following, this

day of April, 1937:

Byron L. Stubbs
Attorney for Plaintiff
530 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Dale R. Kent
Attorney for Defendant
660 South 200 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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APR 20 1937
BYRON L. STUBBS
(3145)
Attorney for Plaintiff
530 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801) 328-4207
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

VAIL J. PHILLIPS,
ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,

vs.
Civil No. C-87-311

UTAH STATE CREDIT UNION,
a Utah corporation,

Judge Leonard H. Russon
Defendant.
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, together with
defendant's motion for summary judgment came on before the
above-entitled court on the 13th day of April, 1987, and after oral
argument being- made by the parties respective counsel,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment be and the same is hereby granted, and the mortgage and
note in question should be forthwith reassigned to plaintiff
together with all proceeds now due or to become due thereon.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary
judcment be and the same is ,^erebv denied with prejudice.
DATED this

day of A p r i l , 1987.
BY THE COURT:

ATTEST
H. DiXON HI.NCL'IY
Cic:x

y\,Lu.:
JUEXJE

/

•ISC//

'

BYRON L. STUBBS (3145)
Attorney for Plaintiff
530 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801) 328-4207
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
VAIL J. PHILLIPS,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
UTAH STATE CREDIT UNION,
a Utah corporation,

Civil No. C-87-311
Judge Leonard H. Russon

Defendant.
On the 13th day of April, 1987, plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, together with defendant's motion for summary
judgment were heard by the above-entitled court; counsel for both
parties presented oral argument to the court and filed written
memorandums of points and authorities therewith; the court having
heard said arguments, reviewed said memorandums and the pleadings on
file in this case, and having fully advised itself in the premises,
and having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment be and the same is hereby granted, and defendant is
ordered to restore and assign to plaintiff the mortgage and note in
question herein together with all the proceeds now due and or to
become due on said note and mortgage.

Said note and mortgage which

is to be restored and assigned to plaintiff is attached to this
Judgment, marked as Exhibits I and II, and by this reference made a
part hereof as if fully set forth herein.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment be and the same is
hereby denied with prejudice.
DATED this

day of April, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

JUDGE

Aooroved as to form

DALE R. KENT
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered a copy of the foregoing
Judgment
%.0^*^day of April, 1987, to:
Dale R. Kent
Attorney for Defendant
660 South 200 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111

EXHIBIT E

E-1

I DALE R. KENT (1800)
| 1200 Kennecott Building
i! 10 East South Temple
nSalt Lake City, Utah 84133
(Telephone: (801) 521-4135
||
!|

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE Or UTAH

I.VAIL J. PHILLIPS,
i
||
Plaintiff,

|l
ll

vs

*

i'
IUTAH STATE CREDIT UNION,
i«a Utah corporation,
|l
Defendant.
Is

:
:

SUPPLEMENTAL
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

Judge Leonard H. Russon
:
Civil No. C-87-311

The above-entitled natter came en regularly for trial

'•"before the above-entitled Court on the 12th day of May, 1989,
t
i

Ithe Honorable Leonard H. Russon presiding; and the Plaintiff
(being

present and represented by his attorney, Eyron L. Stubbs;

'and Defendant being present through its officers and represented
bv its attornev, Dale R. Kent; and the Court having heard the
.testimony of the parties, and having heard the Stipulation of
'.the parties with resard to the narrowine of issues presented;
;,

land being fullv advised in the premises; and the Court havine
i
ii

Dreviouslv made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with
i

fregard to the Crder Granting Partial Summary Judgment, which
i1

lOrder was entered in Aoril, 1987; and being fullv advised in the
ii

I
h
||

.(premises, the Court, therefore, renders the following:
|!

FINDINGS OF FACT

j!

(1)

The

Findings

of

Fact

previously

entered

by

the

fully

set

||

ijCourt are hereby
!
;forth herein.

adopted

and

incorporated

as

though

i

i:

•j

(2)

In November 1985, the Plaintiff was issued a check

;:from Guardian Title in the amount of $27,850.00 made payable
ii
iijointly to Utah State Credit Union and Vail J. PhilliDS.
i,i

j-

(3)

Said check was issued pursuant to and in conformity

'/.with the Assignment of Mortgage which was the additional collate r a l pledged on the Plaintiff's loan with the Defendant.
||

(4)

The Plaintiff

failed

to disclose

to the

Defendant

:!that he had received said check during the entire default period
.under the Deed of Trust.
:j

(5)

The Defendant first became aware of the issuance of

•i

,the check
(Guardian

in November

Title

of

Company

1986 when

it received

requesting

Mountain

a letter

America

from

Credit

Union's help in determining why the check had not been negotiated.
;'
•time

(6)
the

The parties met later in November of 1986, at which

issuance

cf

A.C

zL~e,

the

said

check was

discussed

by

the

!1

i

.parties.

Char

they

discussed

the

possibility

cf

i;
i d e p o s i t i n g the money i n t o an escrow account w i t h the
1

j

jbut the Plaintiff refused to so deDOsit the money.
II
II

!i

Ii

Defendant,

(7)

This

check

jcheck was reissued

was subsequently

by Guardian

Title

cancelled

Company

and a new

on December 11,

'1986, for the same amount.
j

(8)

The second

check

was also

never

negotiated

or

[deposited by the Plaintiff.
•|

(9)

The amount

jlby the Plaintiff

referenced

by said

check was collected

en Kay 12, 1987, by way of execution

against

II

[.Guardian T i t l e Company.
11

II
i
11
[which

•I

(10) This Court can make no finding
o as to the time unon
the Plaintiff's

cause

of action

against

the Defendant

['arose.
(11)

Mountain

America

Credit

Union,

in refusing

to

it

i endorse

the check over

to the Plaintiff, did not in any manner

I!

j intend

to hinder,

delay,

defraud,

or

take

advantage

of the

t'

i'Plaintiff.
ji

;i

From

the foregoing

Findings

of

Fact,

the Court new

| enters the following:
'•

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

M
I;

jj

(1)

The Plaintiff has failed

to mitigate his damages,

jl

iif any, in this matter.
j!
(2) The damages, if any,

claimed bv the Plaintiff were

|J

II , .
[unliquidated.
ii
(3)
The defense
ii

llfaith.

of

the Defendant was asserted

in gocc

(4)

The Defendant was not negligent in its handling of

this matter.
(5)

The Plaintiff should not be awarded prejudgment

interest, nor attorney's fees in this matter.
ST Jl^~

;

|

DATED this °] ^

!
I

I) Ur-k^

day of &ZT} 1989.
BY THE COURT:

9
Jiidge Leonard H. Russon

ij
|Approval as to form:

iByron L . S t u b b s

'I
ij

MAILING CERTIFICATE

i

•!
1

i

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the

.

day

—

,of May, 1989, a true and correct-copy of tne foregoing document
was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
I!
1

'!
\
,
DRK03

i

Eyror. L. Stubbs
530 East Fifth South, Suite 10
Salt Lake City, UT 8^102

EXHIBIT F

F-1

JDALE R. KENT (1800)
[McKay, Burton & Thurman
1200'Kermecott B u i l d i n g
110 E a s t South Temple
(Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84133
jTelephone:
(801) 521-4135
i

|

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

.VAIL J . PHILLIPS,

Ii

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

i

vs.

Judge Leonard H. Pocsson
'.UTAH STATE CREDIT UNION,
j'a Utah corporation,
11

Defendant.

Civil No. C-87-311

11

h

»>
1

The

above-entitled

case

cane on reguiarlv

for trial

i

!before the above-entitled Court on the 12th day of Mav, 1989,
i!
i

/the Honorable Leonard E. Russon presiding; and the Plaintiff

H
being present and represented by his attorney, Byron L. Stubbs;
i'

and Defendant being present through its officers and representee
i

by its attorney, Bale R. Kent; and the Court having heard the

\\

•evidence
introduced at the trial, and the stipulation of the
i
1

1

[parties regarding narrowing of the issues to be tried; and the
ii

.Court having urevicuslv entered its Findings of Fact and ConIt

*

'i

'elusions of Law anc Judgment with regard to the Order Granting
• i

Partial

Summary

Judgment;

and

the

Court

having

previously

i

entered

its

Supplemental

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law; now, therefore, it is hereby,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
(1)

The prior ruling of the Court shall be and the same

Ijshall remain in full force and effect.

it
[j

(2)

The

Plaintiff's

claim

for monetary

damages

and

i!

jlprejudgment interest shall be and the same is hereby denied.
||

;!
(3) Both parties shall assume and pay their own attcrij
Lney's fees incurred in the prosecution of this action.
DATED this 7 /
day of £&r, 1989.

i!

BY THI COURT:

5,
•j

KondraDle Leonard H. Russon

i;

•'Approval as to form:

iBvron L. Stuobs

I. '
j;
MAILING CERTIFICATE
h
ij
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the
cay
i;
;of Ma]/, 1989, a true and correct copv of the foregoing document
ii

*

/was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
l!

j!
||
!

l!

}l
JDRK03

Bvron L. Stubbs
5*30 East Fifth South, Suite 10
Salt: Lake City, UT 8^102

w

